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Abstract  
Corporate organisations operate in a dynamic competitive global environment where real estate 
decisions form an important part of a successful business operation. Fundamental considerations 
cover the drivers of possible disruption from core economic activity, structural change and 
unexpected (Black Swan) events. With documented increases in frequency and magnitude of 
unforseen, rare and extreme Black Swan Events, this research examines an antifragility corporate real 
estate strategy which looks beyond likelihood and resilience, to opportunities to manage and embrace 
key adverse Known Unknown random Black Swan Events. Suggested strategies including modular 
locational operation units, knowledge sharing and real estate partnerships can form part of an 
antifragility real estate framework and assist global organisations to succeed where competitors fail in 
a world affected by increasingly large, highly improbable and unpredictable events.    
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1. Introduction   
For a global organisation, a corporate real estate strategy forms an important part of an organisations 
success as it provides the operational platform for many primary functions (ie production, marketing 
and human resources). While some organisations explicitly consider a corporate real estate strategy, 
many proceed with an overall business plan and pursue real estate transactions as a secondary 
consideration. With a rapidly changing global environment this can lead to future challenges, leaving 
past passive real estate strategies helpless to manage new events which could have been foreseeable 
and preventable. As a consequence of poor corporate real estate decisions, global organisations can 
suffer major distress leading to financial ruin and failure. 
 
To understand the external risks on global organisation’s real estate operations, key determinants can 
be categorised and illustrated: see Figure 1 
 
Figure 1                     Corporate Real Estate Operations: External Risk Factors 
 
Source: Higgins (2015) 
Effect Types and Form
Natural Disasters
Man Made Events
Supercycles
Technical Innovation
- Digital age: 1985 -
Underlying Economic Cycles
Economic Demand, Supply and
Activity Capital Market Drivers
Short 
Term 
Long 
Term
Core Economic 
Environment
Structural Changes and 
Transformation Forces
Unexpected Events
(Black Swan Theory)
2 
 
Figure 1 identifies key external drivers that can impact on a global organisation real estate strategy. 
Importantly whilst past leading underlying macroeconomic indicators have provided a good guide to 
future economic conditions, Trahan and Krantz (2011) explained these forces do not exist in a 
vacuum, as emerging factors both directly and indirectly challenge these core economic activities. 
Long term, structural changes, often initiated by policy decisions and innovation appear to have 
permanent far-reaching real estate implications as to requirements of design and space. The level of 
technical innovation created by the modern digital age has created challenges for many global 
organisations to adapt or perish (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). 
 
In addition, economic cycles and structural changes are clouded by extreme, large unpredictable, 
short-lived events. These Black Swan Events can have enormous consequences on the wider 
economic environment and create uncertainty. They are often the origin of market crashes and can 
have a domino effect, leading to a cycle where those directly involved, and the wider community, 
incur considerable losses. These clusters of negative price movement can vary in time alongside 
extended periods of stability (Buchanan 2013, Taleb 2009).  
 
In identifying a Black Swan World as a key risk, it is often overlooked by global organisations when 
making major corporate real estate decisions. These unexpected random events now form an 
important area of corporate real estate research as a consequence of several recent large scale global 
shocks (superstorms, tsunamis, pandemics (SARS) and acts of terrorism etc). These events can 
severely challenge economic activity, social cohesion and political stability and cascade across global 
systems, irrespective as to whether or not they arise within health, climate, social or financial systems. 
Critically a key element of an organisation supply chain, real estate can receive serious long term 
damage from Black Swan Events. 
 
In developing the research agenda, Aven (2015) and Taleb (2012) detail a recent change from a rather 
narrow risk perspective, based on probabilities and expected loss, to a broader non-probability based 
analysis with a sharp distinction between risk as a concept and how this concept is measured. This 
difference leads to the antifragility concept, where rare and unforeseen events are beyond defined 
probability parameters and resilience only limits the impact. At the expense of probability analysis, a 
non-predictive decision making under uncertainty can offer organisations opportunities from disorder 
to exposing others to downside risk and extensive financial loss. 
 
In summary, Nassim Taleb elegantly explained the concept: 
 
“ I’d rather be dumb and antfragile than extremely smart and fragile …..” 
(Taleb 2012, p4) 
 
To understand the antifragility concept and the application to corporate real estate, this research paper 
peels back the elements and explains the types of Black Swan Events and how a framework can be 
constructed around the categories. Furthermore, with the emergence of new digital technologies, there 
is increased vulnerability to damaging corporate real estate obsolescence with reference to place 
(physical location) and space (organisation that occupy the space). Antifragility risk management is 
reviewed as part of the research with suggested approaches for corporate real estate strategies. 
 
Following this introduction, Section two provides a framework for defining and recording Black 
Swan Events. Section three covers the impact of Black Swan Events on corporate real estate. Section 
four looks at antifragility theory with Section 5 linking the concept to a real state strategy for global 
organisations. The last section provides the concluding comments.  
 
 
2. Black Swan Event Framework    
 
In broad terms, Black Swan Events theory captures large-scale unpredictable and irregular events of 
massive consequence. Although these disasters have been classified as natural, unnatural man-made, 
3 
 
purely social, technological, and hybrid, it has been established that Black Swan Events can be 
grouped into three types: natural, man-made and hybrid disasters (Shaluf 2007). The following 
literature elaborates causation and characteristics of each type of disaster.   
 
Natural disasters are catastrophic events resulting from natural forces which are an unplanned and 
socially disruptive event with a sudden and severe disruptive effect. This is often termed as Acts of 
God where there is no human control. The impact of a natural disaster is localized to a geographical 
region and specific time period. The disaster can be a high-impact disaster that has a greater direct 
effect on the community over a longer period (Higgins 2014, Shaluf 2007, Turner & Pidgeon 1997). 
 
Man-made disasters are those catastrophic events that result from human decisions. These non-
natural disasters can be sudden or over a longer period of time. Sudden man-made disasters include 
socio-technical disasters which due to the interaction between internal and external factors and due to 
the accumulated unnoticed facts. The impact of a socio-technical disaster sometimes transcends 
geographical boundaries and can even have trans-generational effects (e.g. Chernobyl). Therefore, 
proper disaster management should be in place. On the other hand, long-term man-made disasters 
tend to refer to national and international conﬂicts either conventional, or unconventional warfare 
(Higgins 2014, Richardson 1994, Shaluf 2007, Turner & Pidgeon 1997). 
 
Hybrid disasters result from both human error and natural forces such as deforestation resulted in 
soil erosion and subsequent heavy rain causing landslides, floods ravage community built on known 
floodplain, locating residential premises, factories, etc., at the foot of an active volcano, or in an 
avalanche area (Shaluf 2007).  
 
Table 1 tabulates natural and man-made disasters by types and forms. 
 
Table 1:        Black Swan Events: Types and Forms 
Type Types Form 
Natural Geophysical phenomena Earthquakes, Tsunamis, Volcanic 
eruptions 
Topographical phenomena Landslides, Avalanches 
Meteorological, Hydrological, 
Climatological phenomena 
Windstorms, Tornadoes, Hailstorms 
and snowstorms, Sea surges, Floods 
Droughts, Famine, Heat waves/cold 
waves 
Biological phenomena                                                   Infestations, Epidemics  
Man-made Socio-technical   
Technological disasters Fire, Explosions, Leakage, Toxic 
release, Pollutions, Structural collapse 
Transportation  disasters                    Air disasters, Land disasters, Sea 
disasters 
Other Digital Threats, Financial Threats, 
Computer system breakdown, 
Distribution of defective products 
Warfare  
National Civil war, Civil strikes, Civil disorder, 
Bomb threats/terrorist attack 
International  
Conventional war    War between two armies from different 
countries, Sieges, Blockades 
Non-conventional war    Nuclear, Chemical, Biological 
Source: Higgins (2014), Munich Re (2015b), Shaluf (2007), Turner and Pidgeon (1997)   
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In defining the types and coverage, the extent of Black Swan Events can highlight the impact. The 
changes can be demonstrated by comparing the most recent natural catastrophes in the first half of 
2015 to the historical long term average. Table 2 compares the number of natural catastrophes against 
the average and the highest year over the last 30 years. The number of events consists of all the loss 
events irrespective of the size of the event. Amount of losses in 2015 is lower than the average but 
there is an increasing number of events. The highest amount of losses is marked in 2011 caused by the 
earthquake in Japan whereas the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 resulted in the highest number of 
fatalities (Munich Re, 2015b). 
 
Table 2                            Comparison of World Natural Catastrophes 
 2015 
Jan-June 
Average of the 
last 10 years 
2005-2014 
Average of the 
last 30 years 
1985-2014 
Top Year 
1985-2014 
 
Number of all the events 510 440 330 620 (2012) 
Overall losses (USD m) 35,000 95,000 64,000 302,000 (2011) 
Insured losses (USD m) 12,000 27,000 15,000 82,000 (2011) 
Fatalities 16,200 46,000 27,000 230,000 (2010) 
Source: Munich Re (2015a)   
In the recording the increase in Black Swan events, many of the natural disasters occur in defined 
locations. For instance, though timing and intensity if unknown, seismic activities occur with the 
movements of earth’s tectonic plates. This is differ from the pandemic events which have no 
boundaries and can spread rapidly across continents (Higgins, 2015).  
 
Understanding the parameters of measurement is important as catastrophe is identified in the sigma 
database when insured losses, total economic losses or the number of casualties exceed a certain 
threshold which can vary across types of catastrophes. Table 3 tabulates the thresholds as per the year 
2014 (Swiss Re, 2015). 
 
Table 3                                Sigma Event Selection Criteria, 2014 
Insured losses thresholds  
Maritime disasters US $19.6 million 
Aviation US $39.3 million 
Other losses US $48.8 million 
or Total economic losses threshold US $97.6 million  
or Casualties  
Dead or missing 20 
Injured 50 
Homeless 2,000 
Source: Swiss Re (2015)    
Black Swan events are increasingly dominating the global environment with an increasing complexity 
of a tangled web of relationships and other interdependent factors. This complexity not only increases 
the incidence of Black Swan Events but also makes forecasting even ordinary events impossible 
(Taleb et al. 2009). Based on the sigma criteria, Figure 2 shows the level of recorded natural 
catastrophes and man-made disasters during 1970-2014 period. 
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Figure 2  
Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters: Number of Events 1970-2014 
 
 
Source: Swiss Re (2015)   
Figure 2 clearly shows an upward trend, where the number of recorded events has increased from 94 
to 336 in the past 40 years. There were 336 catastrophic events in year 2014 with 189 natural disasters 
while 147 are manmade disasters. The highest reading of the upswing in the man-made disasters in 
2005 is related to the fires and explosions in the industrial operations and in the oil and gas industry 
facilities (Swiss Re 2015). 
 
To distinguish the risk between Black Swan Events, a quote from Donald Rumsfeld, the former US 
Secretary of Defense in relation to the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has become 
the hallmark to define the differences between unpredictable extreme events. The defined categories 
being Known Knowns, Known Unknowns and Unknown Unknowns events (Rumsfeld 2002).  
 
Taking these categories, a framework can be constructed to provide a better understanding of 
uncertainty surrounding Black Swan Events, see Figure 3. 
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Figure 3                                  Distinguishing the Knows and Unknowns: 
   Black Swan Event Framework 
 
Source: Higgins (2014) 
Figure 3 illustrates Black Swan Events separated into three categories: Known Knowns, Known 
Unknowns and Unknown Unknowns. The Known Known event is where we know what could happen 
and when, for example: Y2000 computer bug. These events can be measured and the disruption 
(worst case) forecasted. For the Known Unknown events, these may be quantifiable even though we 
may not know when they will occur, for example: earthquakes.  
 
The Unknown Unknown event is difficult, if not impossible, to model. It is hard to imagine what 
kinds of events might fit into this category (Asteriod attack), although when related to an individual, 
there is the concern about mistaking the unfamiliar for the unlikely.  For example, there were many 
signals that pointed towards the World Trade Centre terrorism attack on the 11 September 2001. The 
aftermath 9/11 Commission report identified three types of systemic failures that contributed to the 
ability to appreciate the importance of these signals, including failures of policy, capabilities and 
management (Silver 2012). 
 
In defining Black Swan categories, relevant information can be sourced on known known events for 
decision making purposes. This compares to unknown unknown events which are difficult for 
individuals to even identify and therefore quantify. This leaves the known unknown category, where 
there is known information although there needs to be corporate property strategies and a 
development of probability theory, as past events may be random and vary in magnitude (Evans 
2012).  
 
 
3. Corporate Real Estate and Black Swan Events      
 
For Corporate Real Estate Executives the impact of Known Unknown Black Swan Events can be 
twofold. Firstly, on a specific location (for example, earthquakes, hurricanes) which can damage the 
physical building. Secondly, economic loss for the space occupier, as operational risk (for example, 
global financial crisis, cyber-attacks) may spread across several unrelated locations at different 
timelines. The unpredictability of these Black Swan Events can have major ongoing implications and 
produce the concerning “fat tail” distribution on the classical Gaussian bell curve. This is where 
outlier risks - extreme events occur (Posner 2010, Taleb 2012). 
 
Known knowns Known unknowns Unknown unknowns 
Model and data 
 Famine 
 Y2000 computer bug 
 
Model but no data 
 Earthquake 
 Terrorism (historical) 
 Global financial crisis 
No model and no data (No idea) 
 Asteroid attack 
 Biological warfare 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No uncertainty Uncertainty 
can be 
quantified 
 
Uncertainty 
cannot be 
quantified 
 
Uncertainty 
cannot be 
quantified 
Continuity between past 
and future 
 
Critical consequences that 
will change the future 
 
Level of awareness 
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Table 4 details Black Swan Events in the Known Unknown category relating to impact on place 
(physical location) and space (organisation that occupier the space).  
 
Table 4                           
Black Swan Known Unknown Events and Corporate Real Estate Impact 
    Form 
Place 
(locational 
risk) 
Space 
(operational 
risk) 
Comments on Vulnerability 
Natural Disasters    
 
Seismic Activity √  
Locational with factors of urban 
growth and limited planning and 
building policies 
 
Weather Related √  
Highly localised impact, coastal 
areas (hurricanes) and low lying 
areas (floods) 
 
Infectious Virus √ √ 
Variations in relation to disease, 
environ. condition and treatment 
capability 
Man Made Disaster    
 
Investment Strategies  √ 
Insecurity of scientific approaches 
within  unpredictable markets  
 
Armed Conflicts √  
Interwoven with religion, social 
instability and  economic poverty 
 
Violence (Terrorism) √  
Normally, specifically focused 
relating to  perceived compensation 
and rewards   
 
Technical  
(Infrastructure) 
√ √ 
Failures in design, operation and 
management can lead to major 
disaster 
  
Cyber Attack  √ 
Critical internet infrastructure can be 
attacked providing failure of systems  
                                                                                                                                          Source: Higgins (2015) 
Table 4 shows Black Swan Events divided into “Place” locational risk and “Space” operational risk 
categories. In the decision making process, corporate real estate managers need to capture and analyse 
the “Place” component, alongside the “Space” elements which can be widespread and unrelated. In 
addition, advances in digital technology can lead to increased connectivity, making secondary 
“Space” impact significantly more after a major Black Swan Event.  
 
Interestingly, in recognising Black Swan Events, the pricing of real estate is based on conventional 
real estate valuation techniques which appear to overlook these ”Place” outliers, as risks are 
commonly pooled to provide a measurement of value. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that 
value is often interconnected by limited comparison analysis and so the risks can reach systemic 
dimensions. Real estate decisions should incorporate sufficient understanding of possible occurrence 
of known Black Swan events to make an astute corporate real estate decision.  
 
 
4. Risk Management and Antifragility   
 
According to Aven (2015, p.183), it is easier to figure out if something is fragile (being ‘easily 
broken’, ‘damaged’ or ‘destroyed’) than to predict the occurrence of an event that may harm. In 
understanding this concept, the goal of risk management is not to accurately estimate rare event 
probabilities but to reveal and assess uncertainties, and make adequate decisions under uncertainty. 
This represents a serious challenge to global organisations on how to handle deep uncertainty such as 
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preparing for climate change and managing emerging pandemic diseases. In every domain, an 
antifragile system is rewarded with long term benefits with protection from adverse events. For 
corporate real estate, this is especially relevant as being the organisations operational platform and 
should form an important element in the risk management process. 
 
Taleb (2012), explained the knowledge mechanism required by which the antifragile strategy 
regenerates itself continuously by using, rather than suffering from random events, unpredictable 
shocks and volatility. The focus on improvements leads to the concept being beyond robustness or 
resilience. The resilient resists Black Swans and remains the same but the antifragile knowledge gets 
better and better. Hence, antifragility is defined as a convex response to a source of harm and so can 
lead to a positive response to increase in volatility as opposed to fragility which suffers from the 
variability of its environment beyond a certain pre-set threshold. A capital market example is to 
research and buy options that provide substantial returns in the likelihood of catastrophic 
stockmarkets events. 
 
Furthermore, Aven (2015) highlighted the robust/ resilient application and the changes from a fragile 
to an Antifragile system. The robust/ resilient situation is characterised by stable frequency 
distributions where uncertainties are small. A fragile system contains large uncertainties where events 
can have large negative values which could lead to serious failure. This compares to an antifragile 
system which is rewarded by good results and protected from adverse events.  See Figure 4 to 
illustrate these concepts. 
 
Figure 4 
Illustration of the Robust/ Resilient, Fragile and Antifragile systems 
 
 
Source: Aven (2015a) p.478  
In Figure 4, the diagrams display applications, for each situation, there can be a corporate real estate 
example. The diagram (A) shows a robust/resilient system which is characterised by relatively small 
consequences of shocks and stressors. On a minor scale, think of an air conditioning system in which 
failure of unit is fixed quickly in order to resume cooling. Diagram (B) shows a fragile system where 
+
-
+
+
-
-
Time
Time
Time
(A) Robust/ Resilient system
(C) The antifragile  system
(B) The fragile  system
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the frequency distribution of the events has large negative consequences. In the air conditioning 
example, plant room failure could results in a complete shutdown of the system lasting several 
months. Finally, diagram (C) shows an antifragile system which is rewarded with good results and 
protected from adverse events. The frequency distribution places heavy weight on large positive 
value. In the air conditioning example, failures are fixed, but there is also an improvement process 
with secondary fresh air ventilation leading to better comfort and performance. 
  
In the context of corporate real estate decision making no locational operations can be fully 
antifragile. It is the understanding and the possible application that can improve global organisations 
competitive performance. The message is that achievable positive returns from uncertainties and 
surprises need to be incorporated at the decision stage. Concepts and measurements of fragility, 
vulnerability and resilience are valuable and offer benefits in a practical context. This looks beyond 
the approach that it is sufficient to use frequency of distribution and insurance to limit the described 
impact of a Black Swan Event.  
 
 
5. Antifragility Real Estate Strategy for Global Organisations   
To consider antifragility concepts, there is this requirement to bridge the theoretical models of 
decision science and those risks outside the realms of regular expectations. Buhl (2011) and Flyvbjerg 
and Budzier (2011) research on IT project planning can assist as to identify  requirements for more 
precise analysis of the outliers, and suggested establishing risk management tools to reduce the 
complexity and decrease the variability of performance in quantitative decision making. This can be 
demonstrated by the following real estate examples within the antifragile outlook. 
 
Designing for Flexibility 
 
Both Flyvbjerg and Budzier (2011) and Taleb (2012) suggests risk management tools that reduce 
complexity, size and duration of planned projects with the objective to simplify the payback function 
of endeavours and simultaneously thinning out the fat tails of extreme risks. This can be achieved by 
modularity, agile planning approaches and limiting the project financing multiplier. 
 
Likewise, Brynlolfsson and McAfee (2014) when examining advances in digital technology linked 
decreased international restrictions on trade, with the rise of global superstar organisations that can 
more easily compete with, and drive out local competitors with a “winner-take-all” strategy. Whilst 
digital technology can lower production costs, it has also lowered the cost of searching for 
information and so opens up specialisation as a source of differentiation. Several of these start-up 
organisations are attractive to global organisations as they offer innovation and growth opportunities. 
 
These modes of excellence in defined industries (communication and pharmaceutical etc) can 
challenge traditional workplace practices, leading to new corporate space strategies with design hubs 
and campus style office accommodation. For Black Swan Events, the key is mobility, as technical 
innovations can lower fixed costs thereby allowing many functions to operate independently and 
digital networks providing access to similar operations in different locations. This can lower the 
impact of “Place” (locational risk), although increases the impact of “Space” (operational risk) 
failures from both the initial and as a secondary feature of a Black Swan Events.  
 
Implementing Safety Barriers 
 
For global organisations, PwC (2012) consider their resilience to external shocks by detailing an 
organisation’s preparedness and adaptive capacity. Simple approaches to standardise language and 
reporting, offers a framework to better inform the operators in different locations. Imposed globally, 
the one framework toolset and single vocabulary can improve knowledge sharing across multinational 
organisations. 
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In developing this research area, more information on the impact of Black Swan Events would be a 
valuable tool for those seeking information for a global corporate real estate strategies. Recognition of 
leading cities resilience to adverse events forms part of Grosvenor (2015) report on Resilient Cities. 
Adaptive capacity to levels of vulnerability is a key research feature and shows recognition by a 
prominent global commercial owner to look beyond classic definitions of property risk measurements.  
 
Harnessing information and examining the advancement of new technologies place additional 
pressures on corporate real estate managers to effectively execute corporate real estate policies. New 
risk fields need standard operational frameworks to strengthen the foundation of the corporate real 
estate discipline. By achieving this, new insights into the relationships between surprising events, 
probability and uncertainty would lead to improve risk assessment and broaden the contribution of 
corporate real estate executives in a global organisations operational strategy. 
 
 Corporate Real Estate Partnerships  
 
Advancement in communication technology can assist with risk management. Similar to 24-hour call 
centres, professional based organisations, such as project managers and architectural practices, can 
operate in global locations sharing knowledge and clients. The creation of operational teams that 
transcend geographic and temporal boundaries can offer lower costs and turnaround times. The shared 
information is also advantageous with improved management knowledge, and if unexpected shocks 
occur in one location, the services can be maintained in the alternative locations and offer a continuity 
of business.  
 
For many global organisations leading real estate service providers are better placed to offer the 
consistent integrated service delivery with sophisticated real estate management information 
technology for worldwide coverage (for example: ANZ Bank, Bayer Pharmaceutical, DB Schenker 
and Microsoft). These real estate partnerships can develop to provide a key component in a global 
organisations real estate strategy, to an extent that they are part of the response to changing 
operational space requirements. 
 
The challenge for global organisations is to look beyond real estate service providers to form 
corporate real estate relationships with real estate organisations offering complete global space 
solutions.  Strong corporate links are being established providing preferred status for development and 
long term ownership (for example: Goodman Group developing and owning Amazon occupied 
warehouse properties across different continents). The challenge is with operational and logistic 
barriers which appear to limit these large real estate organisations providing solutions to corporate 
real estate risk management. Offering flexibility in space and location is a key global real estate model 
for an organisations risk management strategy to an increasingly challenging Black Swan World.    
 
 
6. Conclusion         
Black Swan Events (natural catastrophes and man-made disasters) represent low predictable 
occurrences which have extensive impact across different risk categories. In recording recent 
increases in the number and magnitude of Black Swan Events, the types and forms can be placed into 
a framework covering Known Knowns, Known Unknowns and Unknown Unknowns categories. 
Whereas, Known Knowns can be managed and Unknown Unknowns are difficult to even identify, 
those Black Swan known unknowns events (for example, earthquakes and pandemics) that impact on 
a corporate real estate decisions. In addition, to the focus on signals and early warning, there is a 
strong argument that a global organisation should be prepared for uncertainty and embrace adverse 
events. 
 
Risk management tools can offer an approach to include those Known Unknown Black Swan Events 
in corporate real estate decision making. The antifragility concept can provide a blueprint for living in 
a Black Swan World, were a global organisation recognises and embraces exposure to levels of 
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variation and uncertainty and is prepared to manage the opportunities and so enhance comparative 
performance to competing organisations. 
 
For global organisations, the creation of modular operational teams that transcend geographic 
boundaries can offer solutions to locational Black Swam Events. These need to form networks which 
share common management language and knowledge, to limit the possible impact from Space 
(operational risk) events. The challenge is to link real estate decisions with corporate strategy. For 
many global organisations, partnerships with leading real estate service providers offer the consistent 
integrated service delivery and sophisticated information technology systems for the necessary 
worldwide coverage. 
 
For corporate real estate managers, this Black Swan research attempts to identify, record and include 
those outlier events that directly impact on their real estate decision making. This can be undertaken 
by looking beyond predictions to embrace an antifragile strategy that protects and ever rewards from 
adverse Black Swan Events. Knowledge of these extreme events and effective strategies need to form 
an important part of a corporate real estate manager’s decision making tool kit. If overlooked, Black 
Swan Events can have significant supply chain consequences for global organisations.  
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